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The International Monetary Fund and the Ebola outbreak
In recent months, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) has announced US$430 million of funding 
to ﬁ ght Ebola in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia.1 
By making these funds available, the IMF aims to 
become part of the solution to the crisis, even if this 
involves a departure from its usual approach. As 
IMF Director Christine Lagarde said at a meeting on 
the outbreak, “It is good to increase the ﬁ scal deﬁ cit 
when it’s a matter of curing the people, of taking the 
precautions to actually try to contain the disease. The 
IMF doesn’t say that very often.”2 
Yet, could it be that the IMF had contributed to the 
circumstances that enabled the crisis to arise in the 
ﬁ rst place? A major reason why the outbreak spread 
so rapidly was the weakness of health systems in the 
region. There were many reasons for this, including 
the legacy of conﬂ ict and state failure. Since 1990, the 
IMF has provided support to Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone, for 21, 7, and 19 years, respectively, and at the 
time that Ebola emerged, all three countries were under 
IMF programmes. However, IMF lending comes with 
strings attached—so-called “conditionalities”—that 
require recipient governments to adopt policies that 
have been criticised for prioritising short-term economic 
objectives over investment in health and education.3 
Indeed, it is not even clear that they have strengthened 
economic performance.3 
Here we review the policies advocated by the IMF 
before the outbreak, and examine their eﬀ ect on the 
three health systems. The information was extracted 
from the IMF archives of lending agreements covering 
the years 1990–2014.
First, economic reform programmes by the IMF 
have required reductions in government spending, 
prioritisation of debt service, and bolstering of foreign 
exchange reserves. Such policies have often been 
extremely strict,4 absorbing funds that could be directed 
to meeting pressing health challenges. Although the 
IMF has responded to concerns about its programmes 
by incorporating “poverty-reduction expenditures” 
to boost health spending, these conditions were 
often not met (table). Thus, in 2013, just before the 
outbreak, whereas all three countries achieved the IMF’s 
macroeconomic policy prescriptions, they failed to 
meet targets for social spending.5–7 Writing to the IMF, 
Guinean authorities noted that “unfortunately, because 
of the reduction in spending, including on domestic 
investment, it was not possible to respect the indicative 
targets for spending in priority sectors”.5 Similarly, 
the Sierra Leonean government reported that priority 
spending targets (including on health) were missed due 
to low domestically ﬁ nanced investment.7
Second, to keep government spending low, the IMF 
often requires caps on the public-sector wage bill—and 
thus funds to hire or adequately remunerate doctors, 
nurses, and other health-care professionals. Such limits 
are “often set without consideration of the impact on 
expenditures in priority areas”,8 and have been linked 
to emigration of health personnel.9 In Sierra Leone, for 
example, IMF-mandated policies explicitly sought the 
reduction of public sector employment. Between 1995 
and 1996, the IMF required the retrenchment of 28% of 
government employees,10 and limits on wage spending 
continued into the 2000s.11 By 2004, the country spent 
about 1·2% of GDP less on civil service wages than the 
sub-Saharan African mean.11 At the same time, ﬁ gures 
supplied to WHO reported a reduction of community 
health workers from 0·11 per 1000 population in 2004 
to 0·02 in 2008.12 In 2010, as the country launched its 
Free Health Care Initiative, IMF staﬀ  “stressed the need 
to carefully assess the ﬁ scal implications” and favoured 
“a more gradual approach to the [associated] salary 
increase in the health sector”.13 
Third, the IMF has long advocated decentralisation 
of health-care systems. The idea is to make care 
more responsive to local needs. Yet, in practice, this 
approach can make it diﬃ  cult to mobilise coordinated, 
central responses to disease outbreaks.14,15 In Guinea, 
from the early 2000s, the IMF promoted ﬁ scal and 
administrative decentralisation. Following IMF advice, 
the country transferred budgetary responsibilities from 
Total Of which implementation 
data available for
Of which implemented
Guinea 23 12 3
Liberia 9 9 6
Sierra Leone 36 31 13
Data are Number of targets (spending ﬂ oors). These spending ﬂ oors were set for “priority expenditures” that include 
health, education, and other social sectors. Sources: various IMF lending agreements retrieved from the IMF archives.
Table: Targets on health and other social spending increases since 2000
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the central government to the prefecture level.16,17 Only 
5 years later, an IMF mission to the country reported 
“governance problems” that included “insuﬃ  cient and 
ineﬀ ective decentralization”.18 At the same time, IMF 
staﬀ  noted that the quality of health-service delivery 
had deteriorated.18
All these eﬀ ects are cumulative, contributing to the lack 
of preparedness of health systems to cope with infectious 
disease outbreaks and other emergencies. The IMF’s 
widely proclaimed concern about social issues has had 
little eﬀ ect on health systems in low-income countries. 
Although Lagarde’s comment on prioritising public health 
instead of ﬁ scal discipline is welcome, similar comments 
have been made by her predecessors.19 Will the result be 
diﬀ erent this time?
The Ebola outbreak has tested many global 
institutions and lessons will have to be learned. Many 
of these lessons relate to the detection and control of 
the outbreak, but it would be unfortunate if underlying 
causes were overlooked. In a timely intervention, The 
Lancet’s Commission on Investing in Health called for 
increases in public health spending and attention to 
hiring and training health workers.20 The experience of 
Ebola adds a degree of urgency to the implementation 
of its recommendations. 
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